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REVIEws

LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS
KEEToN. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University
Press, 1963, 137 pp. $3.75

By ROBERT E.

Professor Keeton in Legal Cause in the Law of Torts makes
an erudite plea for the retention of a theory of legal causation
known as the Risk Rule, most eloquently set forth in Judge
Cardozo's opinion in the Palsgraf case.
In an Introduction citing the need for a precise, yet flexible,
rule the author focuses his attention on legal responsibility or
duty. The reader is then plunged into a thicket of theoretical
verbosity in which the Risk Rule is explained, then compared to
other less preferable rules. From there it is a short trip to the
application of the author-favored doctrine, and finally the reader
emerges on the battle fronts of legal causation, a somewhat harrowiig journey.
The problem Mrs. Palsgraf personified by standing too close
to the scales in the train station, was that of the unforeseeable
plaintiff and the duty owed to him. Judge Cardozo reasoned that
there was no negligence between the parties, Mrs. Palsgraf being
beyond the area of foreseeable harm, and that the question of
liability was one of duty, not of mechanical causation. Keeton
carries forth the banner of the Risk Rule (that liability depends
on the results of the negligence being within the risk undertaken)
as a panacea for the problems of duty owed and scope of liability.
Professor Keeton first attacks other existing rules: 1) The
non-rule of practical politics (which, as Judge Andrews said in
the Palsgraf dissent, means that "because of convenience, of public policy, of a rough sense of justice, the law arbitrarily declines
to trace a series of events beyond a certain point"). Keeton says

this rule does not yield a reasonable predictability of legal cause.
2) The "natural and probable consequences" rule. Here the
author finds too many ambiguities of meaning. 3) The "order
and nature of antecedents" rule (that one is responsible for the

natural and proximate causes of his negligence-the In Re Polemis
rule). The author decries the lack of a valid test for direct and
indirect causes.
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After this discussion, Professor Keeton applies the Risk Rule
to various cases to show that it meets the exigencies of clarity and
predictability.
In the final section, he reports the trend toward strict liability,
and with seeming approval of the trend, shows that the Risk Rule
if applied with greater judicial control, can remedy the ambiguities and uncertainties of the other rules. His suggestion is that
the Judge in a negligence case involving causation use the Risk
Rule as a guide to the jury in their determination of whether the
defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff and whether the plaintiff
was within the area of foreseeable harm. The author feels that
by this precise formula, juries will have a more uniform idea of
what they are deciding and where the limits of liability should be.
Dean Prosser in his Law of Torts says that the present state
of the law in this area is one of troubled waters, in which anyone may fish. The remaining question is whether Keeton in
casting in his line has not further served to tangle the existing
lines. It is a laudable attempt to synthesize from theory a workable rule that could lead us out of the labyrintn of unpredictability
which now exists. Plaintiffs, attorneys, and courts could ascertain with more certainty whether when one domino is pushed
over, responsibility lies for all the dominoes that subsequently
fall, or, less picturesquely, where the area of duty lies.
A rule of law designed to cover such a broad field must be
so general that it is inherently ambiguous. A jury, no matter how
well they are instructed to view subjectively what could have
been foreseen, will still always be looking at an accident after it
has occurred. Something that might appear well-nigh impossible
before the event, appears perhaps highly probable afterwards.
But with these inherent limitations, the Risk Rule as presented
by Professor Keeton appears to offer a workable solution.
The approach on a theoretical plane has served to obfuscate
rather than elucidate the argument here and not until the final
section does Professor Keeton get into the specifics that make the
rule seem highly plausible. Nevertheless, this publication constitutes an important step toward a uniform guideline for decision in this area.
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